Pre-Crime for Agents, at the Last Second: Probing When a Recruited Agent Gives In

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Key findings

• On held-out Qwen3-32B episodes, the probe catches 82% of leaking calls at a 5% benign flag rate, versus 26% for a zero-shot decision-model monitor.
• On gpt-oss-20b, a probe on reasoning activations reaches AUROC 0.91.
• A bag-of-words classifier trained on the same calls performs similarly, so most gains come from label supervision, not activations.

📄 Abstract

When AI agents share channels and credentials, one agent can press another to break its operator's rule, a first step towards collusion. Output filters check only what an agent has already written. Can an overseer tell beforehand that an agent is about to give in? We show that a linear probe on the agent's activations can, in a controlled multi-agent setting. Across six scenarios, a peer presses a target for up to 20 rounds to reveal a secret, such as a deploy token; the target often refuses, then gives in. Read at each model call before its output is written, the probe picks out the one that leaks. On held-out Qwen3-32B episodes, at a threshold set to flag 5% of benign calls, it catches 82% of leaking calls. At a similar flag rate, a zero-shot decision-model monitor catches 26%. On gpt-oss-20b, a probe on its reasoning reaches AUROC 0.91. A bag-of-words classifier trained on the same calls comes close, so most of the gain comes from training on labels, not activations. The probe also flags permitted disclosures: it reads the coming disclosure more than the violation. The warning is short-range, and halting on any alarm would stop most benign episodes, which a second text check does not fix. A warning raised before generation could let an overseer stop an agent that is about to give in, ahead of others acting on its messages or recruitment spreading through a swarm.